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Abstract 
It is often difficult to distinguish a stranger’s permanent facial shape from their transient 
facial expressions; for example, whether they are scowling or have narrow-set eyes. Over-
interpretation of ambiguous cues may contribute to the rapid character judgments we make 
about others. Someone with narrow eyes might be judged untrustworthy, because of strong 
associations between facial anger and threat. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the trait 
judgments made by individuals with severe alexithymia, associated with impaired recognition 
of facial emotion. Consistent with the hypothesis, alexithymic participants demonstrated 
reduced inter-rater consistency when judging the character traits of unfamiliar faces, and the 
presence of subtle emotions. Nevertheless, where alexithymics perceived, or misperceived 
emotion cues, the character traits inferred thereafter were broadly typical. The finding that 
individuals with developmental deficits of emotion recognition exhibit atypical attribution of 
character traits, confirms the hypothesis that emotion recognition mechanisms play a causal 
role in character judgments.   
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Introduction 
Humans frequently judge the character of others based solely on their facial shape. These trait 
inferences are far from trivial: the initial impressions we form about someone’s character, 
may determine if, and how, we interact with that person. While our first impressions are not 
always accurate (Olivola & Todorov, 2010), different raters draw highly consistent 
inferences, even when judging static images of actors exhibiting neutral facial expressions 
(Said, Haxby, & Todorov, 2011; Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009; Willis & Todorov, 
2006). Moreover, trait inferences are available extremely quickly. Stable judgements are 
made within 100 ms of the appearance of a novel face (Willis & Todorov, 2006), and inter-
rater agreement is above chance after only 33 ms (Todorov et al., 2009).  
 
Trait judgments made about emotionally neutral models may be a product of neurocognitive 
mechanisms adapted for emotion recognition (Said et al., 2011; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 
2008). It is not always easy to distinguish a stranger’s permanent facial shape from their 
transient facial expressions. According to the emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis, 
permanent facial features that resemble subtle facial emotions may provoke inferences in line 
with those provoked by the corresponding emotional expression (Montepare & Dobish, 2003; 
Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). For example, lower eyebrows – a common feature of facial 
displays of anger – may cause an individual to be perceived as dominant.  
 
Consistent with the emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis, the trait inferences drawn by 
observers correspond closely with their reading of the model’s facial emotion (Said et al., 
2011). For example, emotionally-neutral models perceived to be happy or angry are also 
likely to be judged as trustworthy and aggressive, respectively (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; 
Said, Sebe, & Todorov, 2009). Recognition of facial emotion (e.g. Adolphs, 2002; Hariri, 
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Tessitore, Mattay, Fera, & Weinberger, 2002) and inference of character traits (Engell, 
Haxby, & Todorov, 2007; Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002) are thought to 
recruit similar neural substrates, notably the amygdala. Common mechanisms are also 
suggested by the occurrence of cross-adaptation between traits and emotions. Periods of 
psychophysical adaptation to angry or happy faces make subsequently viewed faces appear 
more and less trustworthy (Engell, Todorov, & Haxby, 2010). The ability to recognise facial 
emotion (Duchaine, Parker, & Nakayama, 2003), and infer character traits typically 
(Rezlescu, Susilo, Barton, & Duchaine, 2014; Todorov & Duchaine, 2008), are often 
preserved in cases of prosopagnosia despite impaired recognition of facial identity.   
 
If trait inferences depend on neurocognitive mechanisms adapted for the recognition of facial 
emotion, individuals who exhibit deficits of emotion recognition should also draw atypical 
trait inferences (Adolphs, Ralph, Tranel, Daniel, Damasio, 1998). The present study sought to 
test this hypothesis by comparing the trait inferences made by individuals with alexithymia 
with those made by typical control individuals. Alexithymia is a non-clinical condition 
characterized by a reduced ability to identify and describe one’s own emotion; for example, 
individuals with alexithymia might know that they are experiencing an emotion, but be 
unaware whether that emotion is sadness, anger or fear (Nemiah, Freyberger, & Sifneos, 
1976). Crucially however, the condition results in impaired recognition of others’ emotions 
(Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013; Parker, Prkachin, & Prkachin, 2005; Prkachin, Casey, & 
Prkachin, 2009). Alexithymia is thought to be the product of developmental dysfunction of, 
or reduced connectivity between, limbic structures implicated in the subjective experience of 
emotion and affect recognition (e.g. Bird et al., 2010; FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, & Mobbs, 
2013; Ihme et al., 2013; Moriguchi et al., 2007).  
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Experiment 1  
Our first experiment sought to verify that our sample of alexithymic individuals exhibited 
impaired recognition of facial emotion. Fifteen individuals with alexithymia (Mage = 28.67, 
SDage = 14.91, 10 females) and 19 typical control individuals (without alexithymia) (Mage = 
22.68, SDage = 3.13, 11 females) participated in the study. No participant had a previous or 
current diagnosis of any developmental or psychological disorder. Sample size was 
determined by the availability of alexithymic participants; 650 individuals were screened for 
alexithymia using the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2003). Of these 
individuals, 15 with alexithymia were identified, and agreed to participate in the study. All 
members of the alexithymia group met the standard criterion for the presence of alexithymia 
(score > 60). A control group was identified through selection of individuals in order that 
groups would be matched according to demographic variables. The alexithymia and control 
groups were matched according to IQ, [t(32) = 1.63, p = .112], assessed by the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999), age, [t(32) = 1.60, p = .131] and gender 
[χ2(1) = .64, p > .250]. All participants took part in all three experiments. Experiment 3 
followed Experiment 2 for every participant, but the order of this pair of experiments and 
Experiment 1 was counterbalanced. 
 
The stimuli used in the first experiment were 14 greyscale images comprising two 
complementary cross-morph continua, blending i) ‘Harold’ displaying anger with ‘Felix’ 
displaying disgust, and ii) ‘Harold’ displaying disgust with ‘Felix’ displaying anger. The 
endpoints of the continua were images taken from Ekman and Friesen’s Pictures of Facial 
Affect, identities M4 and M6 (Ekman & Freisen, 1976). The images were morphed using 
Morpheus Photo Morpher Version 3.11 (Morpheus Software, Indianapolis, IN). The 14 
images represent points along the morph continua corresponding to intensities between 20% 
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and 80% of each attribute, varying in 10% intervals. Facial images were cropped to remove 
external features, and subtended 6° × 8° when viewed at a distance of 60 cm.  
 
Participants completed ten blocks of 28 experimental trials, preceded by eight practice trials. 
Each trial began with a fixation point (1500 ms), followed first by the presentation of a 
morph stimulus (800 ms), and then by a prompt to attribute either identity or emotion (i.e., 
‘Disgust or Anger?’ or ‘Harold or Felix?’). Each cross-morph stimulus appeared twice per 
block, followed once by an identity prompt, and once by an emotion prompt. Attribution type 
was interleaved within blocks, thereby forcing participants to attend to both identity and 
expression on any given trial. The identity and emotion labels were presented at the start of 
the practice and experimental tasks and between blocks.  
 
Figure 1 
 
For the emotion and the identity tasks, the percentage of one attribute (e.g. Harold) in each 
stimulus was plotted against the probability of making that attribution (responding ‘Harold’) 
to that stimulus, for each participant. Psychometric functions were estimated by fitting 
cumulative Gaussian (S-shaped) functions to this data for each individual in Matlab (The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA) using the Palamedes toolbox (Prins & Kingdom, 2009). Perceptual 
sensitivity was inferred from the slope of the psychometric function, defined as the standard 
deviation of the underlying (symmetric) Gaussian distribution, subject to an inverse-
transform to normalize parameter estimates. The experimental programs used in all 
experiments were written and presented in Matlab with the Psychophysics Toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
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Experiment 1 assessed the recognition of disgust and anger, as they are the emotions that 
correlate most strongly with the judgments of trustworthiness, aggressiveness, attractiveness 
and intelligence used in Experiment 2. It should be noted however that this disgust-anger 
recognition task, and an identical task assessing the recognition of surprise and fear, have 
previously been employed to demonstrate significant correlations between alexithymia and 
emotion recognition (Cook et al., 2013) – supporting previous findings of recognition 
impairment across a range of emotions in alexithymic individuals (Parker et al., 2005; 
Prkachin et al., 2009).  
 
Consistent with previous reports of impaired emotion recognition in this population, the 
alexithymia group exhibited lower sensitivity (M = 5.64, SD = 2.28) than the control group 
(M = 8.83, SD = 3.68) to changes in facial emotion [t(32) = 2.937, p = .003], CI[1.29, 6.32], 
and perceptual sensitivity to emotion correlated significantly with individual differences in 
alexithymia severity (r = -.371, p = .015). Conversely, the alexithymic (M = 11.89, SD = 
9.96) and control (M = 12.97, SD = 5.48) individuals did not differ in their sensitivity to 
changes in facial identity [t(32) = -.195, p = .846] and identity sensitivity did not correlate 
with alexithymia severity (r = -.073, p = .681).  
 
Experiment 2  
Our second experiment sought to examine how alexithymia affects the consistency of trait 
and attractiveness judgements made about emotionally-neutral models. The stimuli used in 
Experiment 2 were 40 greyscale images depicting emotionally neutral models taken from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces Database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Ohman, 1998). The 
external contour of each face was visible, but hair and any external features were removed. 
Stimuli were selected based on previous ratings (Lundqvist et al., 1998) to sample a 
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representative range of values for each trait being investigated. Images subtended 9° × 11° 
when viewed at a distance of 60cm. 
 
Four judgments were made about each image (trustworthiness, aggressiveness, intelligence 
and attractiveness). Ratings were made on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 9 
(Extremely). Each trial presented a face stimulus together with a prompt to rate the image on 
a given dimension (e.g. ‘How trustworthy is this person?’). Instructions emphasised that 
participants should base their decision on their first impressions, but no time limit was 
imposed. Stimuli remained present until a response was recorded. Each image was rated 
twice on each dimension, yielding a total of 320 trials. The two judgments given to each 
stimulus were averaged and analyses conducted on the resulting distributions. Participants 
completed four blocks of 80 trials. 
 
For each judgment, an index of inter-rater consistency was derived by calculating the 
correlations between ratings, for every possible pair of participants (Todorov & Duchaine, 
2008; Todorov et al., 2009). Having subjected the raw pairwise correlations to Fisher z 
transformations, the consistency of each attribution was assessed by comparing the resulting 
distributions of control-control pair, control-alexithymic (mixed) pair, and alexithymic-
alexithymic pair correlations. Figure 2 demonstrates that inter-rater consistency was highest 
for the control pairs, reduced for mixed pairs, and lowest of all for the alexithymic pairs. 
 
Figure 2 
 
While participant groups were statistically matched in terms of gender, the proportion of 
females in the alexithymia group was higher (67%) than that in the control group (58%) and 
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several studies have demonstrated an effect of gender on judgments relating to facial 
emotion, including trait inferences (McClure, 2000; Mehu, Little, & Dunbar, 2008). Gender 
was therefore included as a covariate in an ANCOVA with judgement (aggressiveness, 
trustworthiness, attractiveness, intelligence) as a within-subjects factor and pair type (control, 
mixed, alexithymic) as a between-subjects factor. The main effect of gender was, indeed, 
significant in this analysis [F(1,557) = 4.00, p = .046, η2 = .007], and gender interacted 
significantly with the effect of trait [F(3,1671) = 2.81, p = .038, η2 = .005]. The ANCOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of judgment [F(3, 1671) = 71.96, p < .001, η2 = .114]. 
Inter-rater consistency was significantly higher for attractiveness than for all other 
judgements (all ps < .001), and significantly lower for aggressiveness than for all other 
judgements (all ps < .001), regardless of pair type. Crucially, the analysis also revealed a 
significant pair type × judgment interaction [F(3,861) = 18.49, p < .001, η2 = .037]. The inter-
rater consistency of trustworthiness provided by the alexithymic pairs (M = .33, SD = .24, 
CI[.28, .37]) was significantly lower than that of the mixed pairs (M = .41, SD = .25, CI[.39, 
.44], [t(338) = 3.25, p = .001]), which was in turn significantly lower than that of the control 
pairs (M = .46, SD = .25, CI[.43, .50], [t(454) = 2.04, p = .040]). Inter-rater consistency of 
aggressiveness ratings was significantly lower in alexithymic pairs (M = .21, SD = .27, 
CI[.16, .26]) than in control pairs (M = .27, SD = .26, CI[.23, .31], [t(274) = 2.21, p = .028]). 
For intelligence ratings, there was a trend for control pairs (M = .43, SD = .21, CI[.40, .47]) 
to demonstrate higher inter-rater consistency than alexithymic pairs (M = .39, SD = .22, 
CI[.35, .43], [t(274) = 1.81, p = .069]). Strikingly, however, the alexithymic pairs (M = .64, 
SD = .29, CI[.59, .70]) exhibited greater inter-rater consistency than mixed pairs (M = .57, SD 
= .29, CI[.53, .60], [t(388) = 2.30, p = .021]), who demonstrated greater inter-rater 
consistency than control pairs (M = .51, SD = .29, CI[.46, .55], [t(454) = 2.14, p = .030]) in 
their ratings of facial attractiveness. 
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Experiment 3 
Our third experiment investigated how alexithymia affects the consistency of emotion 
judgments made about emotionally-neutral models. The 40 stimuli employed in Experiment 3 
were identical to those used in Experiment 2. Participants rated each stimulus according to 
the extent to which it depicted 6 subtle emotions (happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, surprise 
and fear) on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Moderately). Stimuli again remained present 
until response. Each image was rated once for each emotion, yielding a total of 240 trials. 
Correlations were calculated for each emotion, for every possible pair of participants within 
and between groups, and subjected to Fisher z transformations. Thereafter, the consistency of 
each attribution was assessed by comparing the resulting distributions of control, mixed and 
alexithymic pairs. Inter-rater consistency was again highest for the control pairs, reduced for 
mixed pairs, and lowest of all for the alexithymic pairs (Figure 2). 
 
An ANCOVA including gender was initially performed as above, but in this analysis gender 
was not a significant predictor of judgements. ANOVA was therefore employed, with 
emotion (happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, surprise, fear) as a within-subjects factor and 
pair type (control, mixed, alexithymic) as a between-subjects factor revealed a significant 
main effect of emotion [F(5, 2785) = 48.98, p < .001, η2 = .081]. Inter-rater consistency was 
significantly higher for surprise than for all other emotions (all ps < .002), whereas the 
consistency of sadness and disgust ratings was significantly lower than that of the other four 
emotions (all ps < .001). Importantly, a significant main effect of pair type [F(2, 557) = 
16.05, p < .001, η2 = .054] indicated that the emotion ratings of the alexithymic pairs (M = 
.15, SD = .11, CI[.12, .17]) were less consistent than those of the mixed pairs (M = .19, SD = 
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.12, CI[.18, .21], [t(287) = 3.18, p = .005]), which, in turn, were less consistent than the 
control pairs (M = .24, SD = .12, CI[.22, .26], [t(287) = 3.18, p < .001]). 
 
Pair type also interacted significantly with emotion [F(10, 2790) = 4.83, p < .001, η2 = .017]. 
Alexithymic pairs were less consistent than mixed and control pairs for sadness judgements 
(Mixed [t(388) = 1.96, p = .047]; Control [t(274) = 2.20, p = .027]), alexithymic pairs were 
less consistent than mixed pairs, who were less consistent than control pairs, for surprise and 
anger judgements (Surprise: Alexithymic versus mixed [t(388) = 3.00, p = .003]; Mixed 
versus control [t(454) = 5.58, p < .001]; Anger: Alexithymic versus mixed [t(388) = 2.89, p = 
.004]; Mixed versus control [t(454) = 2.46, p = .014]), while alexithymic and mixed pairs 
were less consistent than control pairs for fear and disgust judgements (Fear: Alexithymic 
versus control [t(274) = 3.03, p = .003]; Mixed versus control [t(454) = 2.37, p = .021]; 
Disgust: Alexithymic versus control [t(274) = 2.70, p = .008]; Mixed versus control [t(454) = 
3.52, p = .001]).  
 
To determine whether participants were basing their trait judgements on emotion cues, we 
calculated for each participant the simple correlations between the trait and emotion ratings 
given to each model. These correlations were subjected to a Fisher z transformation and the 
resulting distributions analysed using ANOVA with emotion (happiness, sadness, disgust, 
anger, surprise, fear) and judgment (aggressiveness, trustworthiness, attractiveness, 
intelligence) as within-subjects factors and group (control, alexithymic) as a between-subjects 
factor. The analysis revealed a significant trait × emotion interaction [F(15, 480) = 24.41, p < 
.001, η2 = .433] confirming that different traits were inferred from the presence of different 
emotions. Faces judged low on happiness, and high on disgust and anger, were deemed to be 
aggressive and untrustworthy, whereas models perceived as happy were rated as attractive 
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and intelligent (Figure 3). Interestingly, the relationship between perceived emotion and trait 
judgements did not vary as a function of group [F(1, 32) < .01, p = .956, η2 < .001], 
suggesting that individuals with alexithymia draw inferences from emotion cues in the same 
way as control participants, despite exhibiting inconsistent attribution of facial emotion. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Discussion 
According to the emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis, trait judgments made about 
emotionally neutral models may be a product of neurocognitive mechanisms adapted for 
emotion recognition (Said et al., 2011; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). Permanent facial 
features resembling subtle facial emotions such as low eyebrows, or narrow-set eyes, may 
provoke inferences in line with those provoked by the corresponding emotional expression. 
The present study sought to test this hypothesis by determining whether individuals with 
alexithymia, a condition associated with impaired emotion recognition, exhibit atypical trait 
judgements. In our first experiment, alexithymic individuals demonstrated reduced sensitivity 
to subtle changes in facial emotion, confirming previous reports. In our second and third 
experiment alexithymia was associated with reduced inter-rater consistency when judging the 
character traits (Experiment 2) and emotions (Experiment 3), of emotionally neutral models.  
 
That individuals with developmental deficits of emotion recognition draw atypical inferences 
(differing to control individuals) about the character of others, suggests that mechanisms of 
emotion recognition play a causal role in trait judgments. These results therefore accord well 
with previous reports that trait inferences correlate with propensity to read certain emotions 
in faces (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Said et al., 2011, 2009) and reports of atypical trait 
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inferences in patients with acquired deficits of emotion recognition (Adolphs, Ralph, Tranel, 
Daniel, Damasio, 1998). The observation of atypical trait inferences in individuals with 
impaired emotion processing, but broadly intact face perception, confirms that emotion cues,	  
based on underlying facial structure, contribute to trait inferences. Interestingly, individuals 
with and without alexithymia demonstrated similar levels of association between emotion and 
trait inferences. One possibility is that emotion detection is causally prior to the inference of 
character traits, and individuals with alexithymia are selectively impaired at emotion-
detection. Hence, whether alexithymic individuals perceive, or misperceive, emotional cues, 
the character traits inferred thereafter are broadly typical.  
 
It is interesting to consider whether the pattern demonstrated by alexithymic individuals of 
atypical emotion and trait inference, in the presence of typical associations between emotion 
and trait judgements, may elucidate the reasons that particular emotion attributions prompt 
particular trait attributions. While debate has centred on semantic links between certain 
emotions and traits (e.g. anger and aggressiveness, see Said et al., 2009), other theorists have 
adopted an ecological approach, suggesting that cues to emotion provide valid cues to 
dominance and affiliation and therefore encourage approach or avoidance behaviours (e.g. 
Montepare & Dobish, 2003). While the ecological approach explains some relationships 
between emotions and traits well, others are less well explained under this framework, such 
as the link between happiness and intelligence. Rather than happiness being a valid cue to 
intelligence, previous research has demonstrated a negative association between happiness 
and intelligence (Veenhoven & Choi, 2012). Future work investigating dominance and 
affiliation attributions in response to perceived emotion in individuals with alexithymia, and 
predictors of trait attributions in this population, may serve to shed light on the relative 
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contributions of semantic associations and dominance and affiliation cues in determining 
emotion-trait correlations in this group.  
 
Interestingly, while alexithymic individuals exhibited poor inter-rater consistency when 
judging trustworthiness, aggressiveness and intelligence, their ratings of attractiveness were 
more consistent than those of control individuals. The relationship between facial emotion 
and perceived attractiveness may differ from that hypothesised for character traits. While 
perceived facial attractiveness may be based on structural attributes including symmetry, 
sexual dimorphism and averageness (Rhodes, 2006; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1999), 
judgements may also be affected by emotion cues. For example, previous results suggest that 
smiling faces are perceived as more attractive (Mehu et al., 2008). Similarly, we observed 
that faces perceived as happy tended to be judged as more attractive. The absence of reliable 
cues to emotion may encourage individuals with alexithymia to base judgments of facial 
attractiveness on structural features such as symmetry alone. As individuals without 
alexithymia base their judgements on both structural and emotional information, the control 
population may therefore exhibit wider individual differences and reduced inter-rater 
consistency than the population of individuals with alexithymia.  
 
The present results not only inform the study of normative trait inferences, but also have 
important implications for the study of social cognition in clinical disorders. It is well-
established that alexithymia co-occurs with several clinical conditions including Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Schizophrenia, Mood Disorders, and Eating Disorders, and may 
be responsible for inconsistent reports of impaired emotion recognition in these populations 
(Bird & Cook, 2013; Cook et al., 2013). The present findings suggest that psychiatric patients 
with co-occurring alexithymia may not only exhibit impaired recognition of facial emotion, 
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but may also draw unusual inferences about the character of others. This may contribute to 
the social difficulties faced by individuals with alexithymia; although it is unlikely that 
judgments about others based on facial characteristics provide genuine information about that 
person, it is possible that making similar judgments to others is an important factor for one’s 
integration into social groups. If a particular individual is regarded by one’s social group as 
untrustworthy, for example, group acceptance may rely on one also concluding that this 
individual is untrustworthy (regardless of their objective trustworthiness). As many clinical 
disorders with co-occurring alexithymia, such as ASD, schizophrenia and eating disorders, 
are associated with impaired social functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; 
Caglar-Nazali et al., 2014; Couture, Penn, & Roberts, 2006), alexithymia may contribute to 
these difficulties through atypical judgments of others. Measuring, reporting and controlling 
for levels of co-occurring alexithymia should therefore be routine practice when studying 
character inferences in clinical populations. We note that published reports of trait judgments 
in ASD have already yielded considerable inconsistency (e.g. Caulfield, Ewing, Burton, 
Avard, & Rhodes, 2014; Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 2013; Pinkham, Hopfinger, 
Pelphrey, Piven, & Penn, 2008). We speculate that where observed, atypical inferences in this 
population may be due to co-occurring alexithymia. 
 
While the current results present evidence for the impact of alexithymia on emotion-mediated 
trait inferences, it could be argued that trait inferences are further influenced by theory of 
mind (the ability to represent others’ mental states, ToM) in real-world social situations. 
Whether alexithymia is accompanied by ToM deficits is currently a matter of debate 
(Bernhardt et al., 2013; Moriguchi et al., 2006; Silani et al., 2008; Subic-Wrana, Beutel, 
Knebel, & Lane, 2010; Wastell & Taylor, 2002); while it is unlikely that the static faces used 
in this study prompted mental state attributions, any ToM deficit related to alexithymia may 
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impact trait attributions in more ecologically-valid settings as a result of atypical mental state 
attributions. This possibility should be a target of future study.  
 
It is of note that individuals with alexithymia did not differ from control individuals in their 
inferences of happiness from neutral faces. Although alexithymia impairs recognition of a 
broad range of emotions, some evidence suggests intact positive emotion recognition in 
individuals with alexithymia (McDonald & Prkachin, 1990). While this is not necessarily the 
case (see Brewer, Cook, Cardi, Treasure, & Bird, in press), it may be true that alexithymia 
does not impede detection of positive cues to the same degree as detection of negative cues. 
This possibility is difficult to determine in the current study, as inter-rater reliability of 
happiness judgments from neutral faces does not equate to objective recognition of happiness 
from expressive faces. As inference of a number of traits has been found to rely on detection 
of happiness cues, however, the impact of potentially typical happiness recognition in 
individuals with alexithymia is of interest. It may be the case that trait judgments that rely 
most strongly on happiness recognition may be made in a typical way by individuals with 
alexithymia. Indeed, intelligence and attractiveness judgments, which rely strongly on cues of 
happiness, were relatively typical in the current experiment. Determining whether intact 
recognition of happiness cues in alexithymia impacts on trait judgments strongly associated 
with happiness therefore remains a priority for future work.  
 
In conclusion, the present findings provide strong support for the emotion overgeneralisation 
hypothesis of character inference. That individuals with developmental deficits of emotion 
recognition exhibit atypical trait judgements, suggests that mechanisms of emotion 
recognition play a causal role in the inference of character traits. Clearly, the use of emotional 
cues to judge character traits is a universal phenomenon, unaltered by one’s emotion 
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recognition abilities. Impoverished recognition of facial emotion, and atypical inferences 
about the character of others, may have profound consequences for the social interactions of 
individuals with alexithymia.  
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Figure 1: The stimuli in Experiment 1 were drawn from two complementary morph continua blending Harold 
displaying anger with Felix displaying disgust, and Harold displaying disgust with Felix displaying anger (left). 
When asked to discriminate the identity and emotion of the stimulus images, the alexithymic participants 
showed reduced sensitivity to changes in facial emotion, but broadly typical sensitivity to changes in identity 
(right). Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.  *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Figure 2: Participants made character and social judgments (Experiment 2), and emotion judgments 
(Experiment 3), about the same emotionally neutral models (top left). In Experiment 2 the alexithymic 
individuals exhibited lower inter-rater consistency than typical individuals when judging trustworthiness, but 
greater consistency when judging facial attractiveness (top right). In Experiment 3, the alexithymic participants 
also exhibited poorer inter-rater consistency when detecting subtle facial emotions, notably surprise and anger 
(bottom).  Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.  *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Figure 3: The propensity to read certain emotions into the emotionally neutral faces (Experiment 3) correlated 
with judgments made about those faces (Experiment 2). Typical and alexithymic participants demonstrated 
similar levels of association between emotion and trait inferences. Whether alexithymic individuals perceive, or 
misperceive, emotional cues, the character traits inferred thereafter appear broadly typical. Raw correlations 
were subject to Fisher’s z transformations and the resulting distributions were evaluated using one-sample t-
tests. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.  *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.  
	  
